bers of a relatively stable set: holism, localism, totalization, coherence, homogeneity, primordialism, idealism, ahistoricism, objectivism, foundationalism, discreteness, and divisive effects.3 It is of some interest that many of the same objections are invoked both by those who speak of reconceptualization and by those who advocate replacement. Perusal indicates that many of these criticisms are interrelated and also that most possess a complex history both in anthropology and in Western social thought more inclusively. Many objections address not explicit definitions of culture but rather diverse implications and connotations held to be entailed by it. The discussion below is in no way comprehensive and doubtless excludes many criticisms currently being raised in an increasingly interdisciplinary discourse.
Culture Is a Reified Abstraction (versus Practice, Action, and Interaction)
Recently and most influentially raised by Bourdieu (1977:26-27 ), this objection has a long history in both American and British anthropologies. "Where is this 'culture' which you talk about as doing this and that?" asked the empiricist skeptical of invisible entities in Kluckhohn and Kelly's (1945:81) simulated dialogue. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:10) of course rejected culture, a "fantastic reification of abstractions," in favor of "actually occurring social relations."4 More recently, from a utilitarian posture, Murdock (1972) wrote that "culture, social system and all comparable supra-individual concepts such as collective representation, group mind, and social organism, are illusory conceptual abstractions inferred from the very real phenomena of individuals interacting with one another and with their natural environments." As it has entered into recent debate on culture, largely via Bourdieu's writing, the objection to reification concerns less the ontological status of culture as an abstraction than the attribution to it of an autonomous and regulatory position relative to human agents and their conduct.
Culture Is Ideation or Meaning (versus Behavior, Practice, Action, and Interaction)
Abu-Lughod recommends the replacement of culture with Foucaultian "discourse" which, she says, "is meant to refuse the distinction between ideas and practices or text and world that the culture concept too readily encourages" (1991:147). As earlier adumbrated by Boas and his students, culture inclusively referred to people's ideation, actions, and manufactures. In 1958, Kroeber and Parsons attempted a segmentation of the social field, and in the division of labor thereafter, as Wolf (1980) cogently put it, "sociology was permitted to claim all the social action and anthropology retained the residual values." Thus was culture more narrowly delimited, excluding what people do and make and referencing ideas, symbols, knowledge, beliefs, meanings, values, dispositions, and classifications. Interactive social conduct, thus deprived of its status as an object of analysis, became the material of observation in which culture was objectified and from which it could then be analytically abstracted and formally described.
Ortner's (1984) elucidation of an emergent "practice" orientation in anthropology can be read, in part, as the chronicle of widespread dissatisfaction with this marginalization of conduct as disciplinary subject matter. If we mean by culture a system of symbols and meanings abstracted from institutions and practices, decontextualized, formalized, and valorized as a thing-in-itself, then anthropology's center of gravity has indeed shifted from culture to practice. It is in these terms that Yengoyan (1986) eulogized culture as a casualty of the practice orientation. The framing of recent disciplinary history in these oppositive termsthe substitution of practice for culture, either as ongoing process or as fait accompli-is sustainable only to the degree that the Parsonsian segmentation was taken as authoritative. Murphy (1971) , for example, is one among many for whom interactive conduct remained a de jure object of analysis all along, regardless of its exclusion from Parsons-derived definitions of culture. Whether culture is seen to be objectified both in ideational-dispositional domains and in conduct or as an ideational-dispositional field that articulates with conduct, it remains unclear how anthropological indifference to action and agency follows as its necessary entailment.
Culture Is Legalism (versus Agency, Strategy, and Improvisation)
Bourdieu (1977:24-25) has argued that culture (and the Durkheim-derived concept of social structure) "implies the construction of a notion of conduct as execution." That culture commits anthropology to a legalist perspective on conduct as rote enactment of cultural rules has been argued more recently by AbuLughod, for whom Bourdieu's practice orientation "is built around problems of contradiction, misunderstanding, and misrecognition, and favors strategies, interests, and improvisations over the more static and homogenizing cultural tropes of rules, models, and texts" (1991:147) . By the mid-1980s, Ortner (1984:150) was able to remark shrewdly that this particular facet of practice theory had been rather overdone, with decisions and strategy almost entirely displacing unreflecting reproduction of custom as the disciplinary stock-in-trade.5 As concerns the resilience of the culture construct, the issue would appear to be whether, in any of its received senses, culture can articulate with a theory of conduct that takes account of improvisation and interested strategy.
Culture Is Objectivism or Superorganicism (versus Constructivism)
Congenial to, although not identical with, a legalistic perspective on conduct is the conception of culture as a field entirely sui generis, the superorganic of Kroeber or the collective consciousness of Durkheim. Says Rosaldo, for example, "In this [earlier anthropological] tradition, culture and society determined individual personalities and consciousness; they enjoyed the objective status of systems. Not unlike a grammar, they stood on their own, independent from the individuals who followed their rules" (1989:32). Essential to the practice orientation described by Ortner was a shift of the individual actor (or actors) from the status of empirical exemplar of culture to the status of subject matter.
Within this orientation, individuals have become central as analytic constructs, specifically as sites of agency both in relation to conduct and to the reproduction and transformation of systems or structures (in their diverse senses). On the one hand, the legalistic representation of action as behavioral execution of the system is rejected. On the other, the image of culture as an autonomous system is itself discredited. Instead, anthropological writing has increasingly focused upon culture as a system constructed, reproduced, and transformed in and through the ideation and practices of agents, either by deliberate design or as contingent by-product. The distinctive character of this constructivist theme in practice theories, relative to earlier actor-centered approaches in British and American anthropologies (see, for example, Barth 1966; Leach 1954), is the rejection not of economism but of methodological individualism, coupled with an insistence that the culture or system comprises the actors' moves and strategies, in addition to existing as their context or constraint.
In recent criticism, the culture concept is characteristically represented as incompatible with constructivist perspectives. Approaches in ethnomethodology (see, for example, Button 1991) focus on the microprocessual coordination (or lack thereof) of individuals' situated understandings and practices as these engender social forms (variously construed as norms, institutions, classifications, "structures") in their "objective" facticity. Another perspective links agency and the inception of new cultural forms to the locals' encounters with states and transnational systems. Says Wolf, for example, Once we locate the reality of society in historically changing, imperfectly bounded, multiple and branching social alignments, however, the concept of a fixed, unitary, and bounded culture must give way to a sense of the fluidity and permeability of cultural sets. In the rough-and-tumble of social interaction, groups are known to exploit the ambiguities of inherited forms, to impart new evaluations or valences to them, to borrow forms more expressive of their interests, or to create wholly new forms to answer to changed circumstances. [Wolf 1982:387] Recent approaches to local-national-global interactions have foregrounded the locals' constructive effects-deliberate or unintended-on the cultural transformation precipitated out of such contexts, replacing earlier images of their passive subjection to determining exogenous forces (world capitalism, McDonaldization, etc.). Increasingly, attention has shifted from the organization of the local by the global to the reverse. Thus, for example, attention is directed to the "indigenization" of exogenous elements-the discrepant reactions of Israeli Arabs, kibbutzim, and Russian immigrants to the television series Dallas, for example (Hannerz 1989:72-73)--or to the impossibility of borrowing cultural material without reinventing it, as with Filipino musicians who replicate Motown but whose lives are "not in complete synchrony with the referential world which first gave birth to these songs" (Appadurai 1990:3).
Culture Is Generalization (versus Individuals and Events)
"The method," wrote Radin in 1933, "of describing a culture without any reference to the individual except insofar as he is an expression of rigidly defined cultural forms, manifestly produces a distorted picture" (Radin 1933:42) . More recently, Abu-Lughod has characterized the culture construct as referring only to typifications and abstractions, at the expense of persons, events, and the qualities of lived experience: "By focusing on particular individuals and their changing relationships, one would necessarily subvert the most problematic connotations of culture: homogeneity, coherence, and timelessness" (1991:154). As used here, timelessness indicates the culture construct's failure to engage the contingent temporal character of particular events in progress and people's subjective experience of them.
Culture Is Holistic (versus Fragmentary)
Of the currently identified defects of culture, "holism" is the most commonly invoked, and the term is used to refer to several distinct but interrelated ideas. In recent cultural criticism, the attribution of holism means variously that the culture construct ignores intracultural diversity and variation (see Culture Is Homogeneity, below), elides contradictory or conflictual elements and represents the constituent forms of culture as globally interarticulated (see Culture Is Coherence and Totalization, below), or postulates that cultures are discrete entities (see Cultures Are Discrete, below).
At a more general level, the imputed wholeness of cultures or societiesthe interrelatedness of differentiated constituent forms which then comprise a bounded entity-has increasingly been examined as the invented artifact of anthropology's theoretical projects and literary practices, with the implication that no such properties characterize social fields "out there." Wholeness is, in a nowconventional idiom, constructed rather than discovered, and this objection to culture cross-references others that draw upon rejections of foundationalism (see Culture Is Foundationalism, below). Curiously, these arguments often begin with the crypto-positivist observation (see Friedrich 1992) that anthropologists cannot experience wholeness as sense data in the ethnographic field situation, that wholeness or the interarticulation of collocated cultural forms is not the material of empirical observation. Thus Tyler (1986:132) speaks of "these [ethnographic] invocations of holism, of functionally integrated systems" as "literary tropes, the vehicles that carry imagination from the part to the whole, the concrete to the abstract." Life in the field is itself fragmentary, not at all organized around familiar ethnological categories such as kinship, economy, and religion, and except for unusual informants like the Dogon sage Ogotommeli, the natives seem to lack communicable visions of a shared integrated whole; nor do particular experiences present themselves, even to the most hardened sociologist, as conveniently labeled synecdoches, microcosms, or allegories of wholes, cultural or theoretical. [Tyler 1986:131] Tyler here both questions the integrity of the traditional monographic categories and refers us to the locals' perspective: Where is holism if the folk themselves have no experience of it? Similarly, Thornton characterizes cultural or social wholeness as the product of objectified tropes: sociological holism involves the mistaken transference of mereological (spatiotemporal part-whole) relationships from such tropes of society as organic bodies, machines, trees, and buildings to society itself (1988:293) . Thornton sees wholeness as additionally created through "mistaken analogy with the [ethnographic] text whose partsnamely chapters, titles, subheadings, paragraphs, and so on-are truly constitutive of the textual whole" (1988:291) . Herbert, who follows Raymond Williams (1983) in pursuing the genealogy of the culture construct into 19th-century British literary traditions, likewise levels the criticism that holistic interrelations among cultural forms are nonobservable, as with his assertion that the Tylorian culture concept "posits a metaphysical, immaterial substance, complex wholeness, that is not commensurate with observed data and can only be perceived (if at all) by a kind of extrasensory perception" (1991:14; emphasis added). For Herbert, this "nonvisibility" of cultural wholeness engendered an epistemological anxiety of which anthropological positivism was the compensatory expression. For Clifford (1992) and others (see Culture Is Localism, below), the "localizing strategies" by means of which anthropologists invent boundaries around cultures are linked to the exclusion of intercultural interaction from ethnographic writing. He suggests, for example, that bounded locales-village field sites, for example-become points of reference for representing a "whole culture" whose external connections are then elided (1992:98).
Culture Is Homogeneity (versus Intracultural Variability)
The culture construct, recent critics observe, fails to represent or theorize adequately the heterogeneous character of disposition and conduct within cultures or societies. Thus, one reads Rosaldo's (1989:207) assertion that "human cultures are neither necessarily coherent nor always homogeneous" and AbuLughod's (1991:154) inclusion of homogeneity as among the "most problematic connotations of culture." Rosaldo's (1989) elucidation of "cultural borderlands"-such intercultural and intracultural spheres as interaction across ethnic boundaries, movement between discrepant statuses and relationships in daily life, and disparities attendant upon difference in gender, age, status, and life experience-addresses questions of both homogeneity and coherence. In question is what Romney et al. (1986) call the "division of labor in who knows what," the nonuniform distribution of knowledge and conduct among individuals and subsets of individuals occupying different positions in the social field. Ethnicity, occupation, age, class or status group, and gender are the typically foregrounded sites of intracultural diversity. An exceptionally interesting perspective on such diversity is offered by Drummond's (1980) analysis of "plural" cultures in Guyana. As against recouping cultural homogeneity by segmenting heterogeneous cultural participants into homogeneous subsets, Drummond's "creole" culture concept explains, for example, not only that men do X and women do Y but that women also know how to do X and sometimes do so, that individuals are the loci of diverse repertoires.
Culture Is Coherence and Totalization (versus Disorder, Contradiction, and Contestation) "Coherence," among the most ubiquitous epithets in recent critiques, seems to reference images of institutional or logical consistency and order. Rosaldo, for example, writes that "[culture] emphasizes shared patterns at the expense of processes of change and internal inconsistencies, conflicts and contradictions" (1989:28; see also Abu-Lughod 1991:154; Clifford 1988:232). The recent message is clearly that the culture construct falsely ascribes coherence to fields of social experience which are incoherent or, at least, less coherent than they have been imagined to be. The claim is not only that cultures are internally diverse (versus homogeneous) but that they are disordered, contradictory, and sometimes disputed.
Contestation, entropy, and chaos have long since displaced coherence and integration as the privileged disciplinary themes, and a variety of distinguishable modes of disorder figure in critical writing on culture. At one level, coherence concerns the imputed inability of the culture construct to refer to what anthropologists (if not demonstrably their local interlocutors) deem to be coexisting but contradictory modes of talk and action-judicial torture by the Apollonian Zunis, for example. At another, the term totalization can refer to one aspect of coherence, the posited global interarticulation of all the concurrent forms in a culture. Ortner, writes, for example, that the concepts of system and structure carry an "implication of singularity and of totalization: a 'society' or a 'culture' appears as a single 'system' or as ordered by a single 'structure,' which embraces (or pervades) virtually every aspect of that social and cultural universe" (1990: 43) . Totalization may refer to multiple interconnections among cultural forms or their regimentation by a single dominant component, principle, or design pervasive throughout the system. Anthropological totalizations have taken diverse forms: the configurationalism of Benedict, the integration of Malinowski and of structural functionalism, the "order of orders" of LeviStrauss, Marxian modes of production, and, most recently, that whole of wholes in which all others are subsumed, the encompassing world system. In terms of functional integration or of thematic configuration, cultures are noncoherent to the degree that some constituent elements lack systemic integration and simply coexist in collocation. Perspectives skeptical of totalization need not entail rejection of all interconnections between coexisting cultural forms. Rather it is a question of more or less interrelatedness, of allowing scope for such less orderly arrangements as contradictory or unaligned elements, more or less loosely articulated subsystems, and redundancy.
A different index of noncoherence concerns cultural forms that coexist in oppositive or contradictory relation: "Culture as multiple discourses, occasionally coming together in large systemic configuration, but more often coexisting within dynamic fields of interaction and conflict" (Dirks et al. 1994:4). On the one hand, there is the Two Crows phenomenon, the question of disagreement as to what does or should exist in society and the cosmos.6 Such disagreement becomes especially relevant as it pertains to valued stakes and becomes, therefore, the basis of tacit or overt contestation and debate. Contestation engages, in turn, with the Gramscian question of whose culture shall be dominant and with whose well-being the officially valorized forms most congenially articulate.
The socially universal allocation of persons to distinct groups with unequal or differentiated access to material or symbolic capital has multiple relevance to questions of cultural homogeneity and coherence. That cultures or social structures are socially, cognitively, and ecologically good for all the people who participate in them has been a fundamental assumption, explicit or tacit, of much anthropological writing. The anthropological culture construct, it could be claimed, thus guarantees a certain obliviousness to contending interests, to inequalities predicated upon age, gender, class, status group, or position in junctures of intersocietal interaction. The consequences are then, at once, a failure to register the diversity of practices and discourses exhibited by agents occupying different sites in the system, and a blindness to politico-economic criteria-both within and beyond the relevant social boundaries-as exceptionally privileged loci of cultural organization. In specific relation to the culture concept, a significant theme in anthropological writing on gender has been to relate genderlinked intracultural differences to the varying positions men and women occupy in local schemes of authority and prestige (see, for example, Ardener 1975).
With respect to such concerns, Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony has been influential in relating intracultural differences to the politico-economic position of agents. As Raymond Williams put it, hegemony "goes beyond 'culture' in its insistence on relating the 'whole social process' to specific distributions of power and influence" (1977:108-109). Not the least of the concept's advantages is its attention to difference and contradiction not only between but within the cultural repertoires of groups or individuals occupying like positions, as when Gramsci writes of "two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness)" in which the "masses" participate (1971:326). Ortner (1990:44-45; see Ortner 1984) subsequently used the concept not as a substitute for but as a characterization of culture: in any society, certain cultural forms may be dominant or hegemonic, others counterhegemonic, and still others simply present in nonconflictive relation to the others.
Cultures Are Discrete (versus Overlapping and Unbounded)
Perhaps the major problem of holism concerns the delimitation of boundaries between cultures. Early on, Lowie, exhibiting much the same lack of enthusiasm for cultural boundaries that Sapir and Goldenweiser expressed for the superorganic, wrote, "In defiance of the dogma that any one culture forms a closed system, we must insist that such a culture is invariably an artificial unit segregated for purposes of expediency" (1937:235 assumed to exceed intracultural difference and intercultural sameness, and this becomes the justification for discriminating discrete cultures. The second and more common strategy deals with the problem of boundaries between cultures by deriving them ready-made from boundaries between social collectivities. Thus the boundaries of a culture have been guaranteed by the cultural criteria-variously ethnic, political, linguistic, or especially territorial-defining the boundary of a social collectivity in which the culture is contextualized, the society whose culture it is. Kwakiutl culture is both a culture and Kwakiutl culture neither because its content is unique (many elements are present elsewhere) nor because of its unique configurational gestalt but because it is contextualized in a social collectivity delimited by territory, identity, linguistic criteria, and the classifications anthropologists have made of these. The transposition of the problem of demarcation from the fields of cultural practice and discourse themselves (which could ideally delimit bounded social collectivities) to bounded social collectivities (which then return the favor and delimit discrete cultures) is not an advance in precision. Although Hastrup has asserted confidently that "unlike a society which is an empirical entity, culture is an analytical implication" (1990:45-61), society, as an anthropological construct, has exhibited lability and instability in like measure with culture and exhibited similar problems of delimitation.
An exceptionally privileged and authoritative diacritic of cultural boundaries has been local conceptions of social likeness and distinctiveness. To the degree that the local reckonings of we-ness and other-ness ("We are Karoks, they are Hupas") are reproduced in anthropological representations of boundaries ("Karok society/culture is distinct from Hupa society/culture"), the work of delimiting cultural units is displaced onto the people themselves. And, while such reckonings indeed construct and reproduce tangible zones of difference, the native point of view may be inadequate for many purposes. Recent criticism has foregrounded the degree to which criteria of delimitation are multiple, redundant, incongruent, and overlapping. From one point of view, it is not that there exist no boundaries that could delimit cultures or collectivities but that there is a superabundance of them, no two of which segment the social or cultural field in precisely the same way. Some years ago, Southall wrote that "the close identity of language, culture, and society (if it ever existed) is now blurred and has become a series of alternatives" ( From a different perspective, the absolute incompatibility of cultural boundaries with intercultural resemblance and borrowing remains undermotivated in Kahn's argument. The claim that cultural borrowing precludes identification of distinguishable cultures ignores the configurational process of indigenization. The Minangkabau, to be sure, may watch Dallas, but it is questionable that they experience it in the same terms as its (multiple) American audiences. Cultural transfer, from this perspective, compounds boundaries as much as it erodes them; movements of "exotic" materials reinforce as well as erode local reckonings of "we" and "they."8 Appadurai (1988, 1990) has formulated somewhat similar criticisms of cultural discreteness, suggesting that the culture concept entails inattention to regional and global interactions. Appadurai's elucidation of "ethnoscapes" concerns incongruent boundaries, the increasingly discrepant distributions of social collectivities, ethnic and social identities, manufactures, and ideologies: "Our very models of cultural shape will have to alter, as configurations of people, place and heritage lose all semblance of isomorphism. Recent work in anthropology has done much to free us from the shackles of highly localized, boundary-oriented, holistic, primordialist images of cultural form and substance" (1990:20) . The dominant image in Appadurai's exposition of global culture is motion: the dispersion of groups through transnational space, the transfer of cultural materials between multiple spatial loci, the movement of people and of culture across boundaries. From this perspective, cultures lack boundaries not only because their forms and contents are increasingly mobile but because emergent cultural materials are precipitated out of the interaction between collectivitieslocalized or dispersed-within the global ecumene. Thus such elements of culture as desires, aspirations, and social identities are no longer reproduced transgenerationally via enculturation but created and continually reconfigured in changing contexts of cultural transmission.
The obvious question is again how (or whether) one delimits cultures in such a continuum. Appadurai suggests that we begin to think of the configuration of cultural forms in today's world as fundamentally fractal, that is, as possessing no Euclidean boundaries, structures, or regularities. Second I would suggest that these cultural forms, which we should strive to represent as fully fractal, are also overlapping, in ways that have been discussed only in pure mathematics (in set theory for example) and in biology (in the language of polythetic classifications). Thus we need to combine a fractal metaphor for the shape of cultures (in the plural) with a polythetic account of their overlaps and resemblances. [1990:20] Appadurai goes on to pose the relevance of chaos theory for anthropology, an appeal to the authoritative practices of the hard sciences, but this time one in which process, flow, and uncertainty rather than stability and structure are the privileged foci. Here, cultures remain integral enough to be pluralized and to exhibit overlaps and resemblances. The image of a fractal configuration of cultural forms suggests, however, that no segmentations of human populationswhether by territory or by polities or by self-defined social collectivities-qualify as criteria for the delimitation of cultural boundaries. The collapse of these conventional reference points produces a salutary sense of vertigo. Since people everywhere persist in classifying themselves and others, often in multiple ways, as members of distinguishable if not discrete social collectivities with distinguishable if not discrete practices, the question remains as to whether this particular facet of culture(s) can continue to serve, as it typically has in the past, to contextualize representations of plural cultures.
Culture Is Localism (versus External Interaction)
As an attribute of the culture concept, localism conveys at once images of cultures as discrete territorial units and as isolated from external interactions, problems closely aligned with those to discreteness (see above) and primordialism (see below). By fabricating images of exotic provincialism and ignoring external interactions, culture guarantees both inattention to borrowed forms (Boas did not study Kwakiutl Christianity) and obliviousness to processes of invention and transformation arising from exogenous cultural transfers and the politicoeconomic contexts in which these are embedded. Anthropology's interchange with political economy (see Marcus [Furthermore], if we think of such interaction ["historically changing, imperfectly bounded, multiple and branching social alignments"] not as causative in its own terms but as responsive to larger economic and political forces, the explanation of cultural forms must take account of that larger context, that wider field of force. "A culture" is thus better seen as a series of processes that construct, reconstruct, and dismantle cultural materials, in response to identifiable determinants. [Wolf 1982:387] In the wake of Wolf's contributions, assertions that cultures are not pristine and isolated have proliferated, hand in hand with claims that the anthropological culture construct represents them as being so. Marcus, for example, asks, "What is holism once the line between the local worlds of subjects and the global world of systems becomes radically blurred?" (1986:171). For Appadurai, the dominant metaphor is confinement: while there never existed groups "confined to and by the places to which they belong, groups unsullied by contact with a larger world," anthropology' A second theme links localism to stereotypy. Said (1978:332), for example, characterizes as "highly debatable" the idea that "there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically 'different' inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space." Appadurai uses "totalization" to refer to "making specific features of a society's thought or practice not only its essence but also its totality" (1988:41), a synecdoche he traces from German romanticism, Hegelian holism, Marxism, and Mauss's concept of total social phenomena. Anthropology selectively identifies cultural forms that stereoptypically epitomize groups-or places inhabited by groups-and differentiate them from others: "Hierarchy is what is most true of India and it is truer of India than of any other place" (1988:40) .
Enthusiasm for reanalyzing all non-Western cultures and cultural materials as the by-product of European expansion has, of course, recently begun to subside in the face of more nuanced assessments. Says Clifford, for example, "Anthropological 'culture' is not what it used to be. And once the representational challenge is seen to be the portrayal and understanding of local/global historical encounters, co-productions, dominations, and resistances, then one needs to focus on hybrid, cosmopolitan experiences as much as on rooted, native ones" (1992:101).
Culture Means Ahistoricity (versus History and Change)
The question of the imputed ahistoricism of the culture construct is logically distinguishable from localism, but the two are typically conjoined. "Culture," for Clifford (1988:235) , "is enduring, traditional, structural (rather than contingent, syncretic, historical)." For Rosaldo (1989:28), "[culture] emphasizes shared patterns, at the expense of processes of change." He goes on to describe his and Michelle Rosaldo's resistance, during their second period of field research in 1974, to studying external influences on the Ilongots: "The broad rule of thumb under classic norms to which Michelle Rosaldo and I still ambivalently subscribed seems to have been that if it's moving it isn't cultural" (1989:208). The "then-fading classic concept of culture" could not, for them, encompass "flux, improvisation, and heterogeneity" (1989:208).
The claim that the culture concept is ahistorical exhibits distinct modalities. First, it can mean that the concept represents other people's cultures as lacking an internal historical dynamic: the Asiatic mode of production of Marx, for example, or the "cold societies" of Levi-Strauss. Second, it can mean that the concept represents other people's cultures as lacking notions commensurable with those of Western history (the "past," irreversible event sequences, humans as constructive agents, etc.). Third, it can mean that the culture concept is definitionally synchronic, necessarily excluding study of past conditions of particular cultures and therefore precluding attention to external contacts and cultural change. As Rosaldo suggests, in certain disciplinary contexts the phrase "Ilongot culture" could more readily refer to head-hunting than whatever Ilongots were making of a recently introduced Christianity; the latter was "acculturation." Rosaldo (1989:28) specifically qualifies his generalization, noting both the obvious historicism of the Boasians and the reemergence of history in the 1980s as a major theoretical orientation in anthropology. These exceptions cast doubts on the necessary ahistoricism of the culture construct. One can add that there has existed a certain continuity in American attention to history and to sociocultural change, manifested variously in acculturation studies, in neoevolutionary writing, and in the congeries of approaches labeled ethnohistory.
Culture Means Primordialism (versus Syncretism and Invention)
The rubric "primordialism" encompasses several of the criticisms enumerated above, specifically as they address a set of related ideas that commit the culture construct to spurious notions of authenticity. Specifically, the authentic "native" or the authentic culture is contextualized in a social collectivity that is local (versus mobile or dispersed) and isolated (versus externally interactive). Additionally, the forms comprising cultures are authentic insofar as the forms are indigenous (versus being borrowed) and are continuously and transgenerationally reproduced in unchanged form (versus being improvised or invented) (see Appadurai 1988:37; Clifford 1988) . It is presumably to such images that Appadurai (1990:20) refers when he speaks of "holistic, primordialist images of cultural form and substance." The antithesis to the primordialist culture construct is one whose forms are selectively and deliberately appropriated from a heterogeneous assortment of repertoires. In a world of accelerating cultural transfer, "culture becomes less what Bourdieu would have called a habitus (a tacit realm of reproducible practices and dispositions) and more an arena of conscious choice, justification, and representation, the latter often to multiple and spatially dislocated audiences" (Appadurai 1990:18).
Culture Is Representationalism and Foundationalism
Culture or cultures, recent criticism states, are anthropologically imagined as though they are objects comparable to those theorized by the physical sciences. Antipositivist counterassertions that cultures are not such objects have recently proliferated. Tyler, for example, derides "the absurdity of 'describing' nonentitites such as 'culture' and 'society' as if they were fully observable, though somewhat ungainly bugs" and asserts that "in ethnography, there are no 'things' there to be the object of a description... there is rather a discourse, and that too, no thing" (1986: The Lone Ethnographer depicted the colonized as members of a harmonious, internally homogeneous, unchanging culture. When so described, the culture appeared to "need" progress or economic and moral uplifting. In addition, the "timeless traditional culture" served as a self-congratulatory reference point against which Western civilization could measure its own progressive historical evolution. [Rosaldo 1989:31] Similarly, for Dirks ( 
The Construction of Defective Culture
Certain of the criticisms sketched above take assertions about the culture concept's past definitions and connotations as evidence for claims that it should be, is being, or has already been displaced by more useful substitutes. Such criticism presupposes some stability and uniformity in past definitions. It can plausibly be argued that a set of core meanings has been commonly (if not univer-sally) present in anthropological definitions and characterizations of culture. Stocking (1982:230) , for example, identifies the essential elements of the Boasian construct as "historicity, plurality, behavioral determinism, integration and relativism." Likewise, assertions that culture is nonbiogenetic, contextualized in some ethnic or social collectivity, and global-that it comprises a "whole way of life"-have been and continue to be common meanings of the construct. Culture, nonetheless, has undergone a career of multilinear development, and if we talk of a single construct it is one exhibiting exceptional synchronic and diachronic lability. Thus, more iconoclastically, culture can be represented as "a class of phenomena conceptualized by anthropologists in order to deal with questions they are trying to answer" (Kaplan and Manners 1972:3) or as representing "a shared terminology rather than substantial conceptual agreement" in the discipline (Kahn 1989:6). There exist, of course, both resemblances and differences in how anthropologists have defined the concept and characterized what it refers to. Recent arguments that the culture construct is evanescent and dispensable foreground conceptual stability rather at the expense of lability, presupposing that there existed in the past and into the present a culture construct with a determinate definition, now discredited. Such stability in definition is not readily apparent. When we encounter arguments today that the culture construct should be abandoned, we must naturally wonder which of its formulations from among all the possible ones we should be rid of. Such criticism affords an exceptional opportunity to investigate what it can mean to say of a construct that it is dispensable when there has existed so little disciplinary consensus as to its definition, characterization, and reference.
The critics' assertions regarding what culture means and references in anthropology are themselves questionable as principled representations of the concept's complex and heterogeneous intellectual history. Put another way, these images of culture are themselves inventions rather than representations. Recent critics, through selective forays into disciplinary history, have retrospectively synthesized images of the culture concept, devising essentialist representations of what culture has signified or connoted in its anthropological usages. This culture concept-as thus reconstructed-exhibits, to be sure, from the perspective of social theory in the 1990s, defects and biases of sufficient gravity to warrant dispensing with it, if indeed they are all that those who theorized culture in the past ever had to offer us. The rhetorical strategies utilized in this recent cultural criticism identify as essential to the culture construct just those assertions about cultural experience which disciplinary practice today construes as logically or empirically misconceived. Such characterizations identify as constitutive of the culture construct certain earlier meanings (coherence, ahistoricism, homogeneity) uncongenial to contemporary disciplinary beliefs, while at the same time selectively excluding certain other earlier meanings (constructivism, disorder, diversity) that happen, ironically, to be continuous with such beliefs. The culture concept is therefore retrospectively positioned in the antipodes of the theoretical perspectives currently in place.
Given the centrality of the culture concept in anthropology, considerable symbolic capital accrues to authoritative pronouncements that it is changing or that it is evanescent. The question then arises as to whether an expendable "straw culture" is thus being retrospectively devised. It is not that the defects foregrounded in recent cultural criticism are fabrications or that they have not been integral to many influential definitions and deployments of culture. But the recent literature exhibits, to say the least, a strategic inattention to the many (equally influential) exceptions and alternatives to the essentialized concept thus reconstructed.
Culture, Authentic and Inauthentic
Current objections to culture associated with political economy and postmodern writing intersect in the writing of James Clifford. Clifford neither writes the concept off as hopeless nor issues performative announcements of its demise. Rather culture emerges in his criticism as a construct valuable for its pluralism and relativism but seriously flawed in its primordialist assumptions. Clifford's reflections on culture foreground both the textually-theoretically constructed (versus discovered) character of the concept and the historically constructed (versus primordial) character of its referents.
Cultures are not scientific "objects" (assuming such things exist, even in the natural sciences). Culture, and our views of "it," are produced historically and are actively contested. [1986:18] If culture is not an object to be described, neither is it a unified corpus of symbols and meanings that can be definitively interpreted. Culture is contested, temporal, and emergent. Representation and explanation-both by insiders and outsidersis implicated in this emergence [1986:19] Cultures cannot be scientific objects if they are historical products, and neither can representations of culture be scientific because they are also historical products. Clifford, nonetheless, implies that there are cultures "out there" and that our constructs can exist in some (perhaps improvable) referential relationship to them. This cornerstone of the anthropological discipline proved to be vulnerable under cross-examination. Culture appeared to have no essential features. Neither language, religion, land, economics, nor any other key institution or custom was its sine qua non. It seemed to be a contingent mix of elements. At times the concept was purely differential: cultural integrity involved recognized boundaries; it required merely an acceptance by the group and its neighbors of a meaningful difference, a we-they distinction. But what if the difference were accepted at certain times and denied at others? And what if every element in the cultural melange were combined with or borrowed from external sources? At times the experts seemed to suggest that culture was always acculturating. But then how much historical mix and match would be permissible before a certain organic unity were lost? Was the criterion a quantitative one? Or was there a reliable qualitative method for judging a culture's identity? [1988:323] Notwithstanding Clifford's (1988:337) claim that "by 1978 the modern [anthropological] notion of culture was part of the trial's common sense," it can be suggested, after reflecting on these passages, that the difficulty concerned rather the tension between the primordialist connotations of an exoteric culture concept as legally construed and the nonprimordialist (and, to be sure, proportionately ambiguous) characterizations of culture ("a contingent mix of elements," "culture was always acculturating") expressed by anthropologists brought in as expert witnesses. As paraphrased by Clifford, certain of these witnesses represented culture as referencing a mutable, syncretic, and dispersible field of ideation and practice, lacking any essential core or content and detachable from territory, language, and heredity. Such testimony, clearly refractory to folkAmerican notions of genuine Indian culture, parallels Clifford's own reflections on groups, communities, and tribes:
Groups negotiating their identity in contexts of domination and exchange persist, patch themselves together in ways different from a living organism. A community, unlike a body, can lose a central "organ" and not die. All the critical elements of identity are in specific conditions replaceable: language, land, blood, leadership, religion. Recognized, viable tribes exist in which any one or even most of these elements are missing, replaced, or largely transformed. [1988:338] And so, also, for cultures. Clifford, however, in these contexts, seemingly ascribes to the culture concept the same properties of organic unity, coherence, and continuity that he claims the culture concept itself attributes to the fields of social experience it represents. It is as though these defects are both essential to the concept and exhaustively characteristic of all its uses. To be sure, Mead's privileging of the "authentically indigenous" over the "inauthentically borrowed" is refractory to current disciplinary concerns with margins, borderlands, and intersystems. But objections to such notions of discreteness and authenticity are hardly unprecedented. Whether any concept predicating differences in fields of social experience necessarily inscribes itself in hierarchy is a complex question. Baudrillard's (1993:124-139) reflections on modalities of difference and otherness suggest interesting approaches to the problem. I focus here more narrowly on AbuLughod's characterization of culture as a flawed concept which incorrectly characterizes its object, on the concept's imputed ahistoricity, coherence, discreteness, and the rest.
As there is no
Unlike Clifford, Abu-Lughod explicitly advocates replacing culture: the proposed substitutes are Bourdieu's "practice" and theories of "discourse" deriving from Foucault and from sociolinguistics. Abu-Lughod enumerates what she takes to be the advantages of practice and discourse over culture: practice stresses strategies over rules, Foucaultian discourse "refuse[s] the distinction between ideas and practices," linguistic discourse perspectives capture "multiple, shifting, competing statements," and all three work against boundedness and idealism (1991:147-148). In the exigencies of the encounter between theory and field data, Abu-Lughod argues that the substitutes exhibit superior interpretive and analytical power. A footnote, for example, provides concrete exemplification of the superiority of discourse as an antidote to the "timelessness, coherence, and homogeneity" entailed in the culture construct:
In my own work on an Egyptian Bedouin community I began to think in terms of discourses rather than culture simply because I had to find ways to make sense of the fact that there seemed to be two contradictory discourses on interpersonal relations-the discourse of honor and modesty and the poetic discourse on vulnerability and detachment-which informed and were used by the same individuals in differing contexts [Abu- Lughod 1991:162] She notes further that two distinct discourses on death characterized men and women and legitimized power differences between them. The import is clear. "Discourse" permits us to theorize and represent contradiction and heterogeneity, whereas "culture," by definition, cannot. In another context, remarking on the apparent contradiction between lewd humor and Islamic religiosity in an old woman's speech, Abu-Lughod writes, "How does this sense of humor, this appreciation of the bawdy, go with devotion to prayer and protocols of honor? ... What can 'culture' mean, given this old woman's complex responses?" (1991:155).
Obviously nothing, if the culture construct is characterized in such a way that it cannot refer to (nominally) contradictory or heterogeneous discourses. An equally obvious response is that culture can continue to mean what it has meant in the diversity of its past usages because it is not in these but only in AbuLughod's representation of them that contradiction and heterogeneity are excluded from consideration. In question is whether "discourse" is better able than "culture" to elucidate, for example, Malinowski's assertion in 1926 that "human cultural reality is not a consistent logical scheme, but rather a seething mixture of conflicting principles" (1926:121) or Sapir's conclusion in 1938 that anthropology is concerned not with a society nor with a specimen of primitive man nor with a cross-section of the history of primitive culture, but with a finite, though indefinite, number of human beings, who gave themselves the privilege of differing from each other not only in matters generally considered as "one's own business" but even on questions which clearly transcended the private individual's concern and were, by the anthropologist's definition, implied in the conception of a definitely delimited society with a definitely discoverable culture. [Sapir 1949:569-570] Distinct concepts are usefully signaled by distinct labels. Conversely, distinct labels engender consciousness of conceptual distinctiveness. The relation of Foucault's "discursive practices" or Bourdieu's "practice theory" to "culture" or "culture theory" is genealogically complex. Either resemblance and difference can be foregrounded, depending especially on whose characterizations of culture are given cognizance. Plausible arguments could be advanced that these concepts address certain facets of social experience neglected or ignored by the culture construct. The difficulty is that the facets upon which AbuLughod focuses--interested strategic conduct, diverse and contradictory propositions, and the like-figure both in practice-discourse theories and in earlier anthropological discussions of culture. The claim that the meanings of practice or of discourse engage specific facets of social experience that the meanings of culture definitionally exclude is questionable. In this respect, the phonological shapes /praektis/ and /diskowrs/ are no better or worse than /kAlcar/ as ways of talking about contradiction and agency in Bedouin social experience. Again, it could be argued that these concepts go "beyond" what is possible with the culture concept-delineating novel or superior perspectives on social diversity or contradiction, for example-but the argument does not take this direction either. Rather, in Abu-Lughod's discussion, nomenclatural practices become detachable from the question of conceptual likeness or unlikeness. Specifically, through an implicit ideology of lexical hygiene, discourse and practice seem to derive their imputed conceptual superiority from their graphic or phonological difference from culture. What results is reference to familiar signifieds-contradictory principles, heterogeneous actions-with new and more impressive signifiers, an eventuality Abu-Lughod herself prophetically envisions when she writes that "there is always the danger that these terms will come to be used simply as synonyms for culture" (1991:147).
Another facet of Abu-Lughod's critical treatment of culture concerns generalization. "Anthropologists," she writes, "commonly generalize about communities by saying that they are characterized by certain institutions, rules, or ways of doing things" (1991:153). In her argument, generalization both creates exaggerated notions of cultural difference (by homogenizing the others) and impoverishes ethnography's object by eliding the experiences of particular individuals in relation to particular events. Dissatisfaction with the position that culture or social structure concerns only typifications abstracted from the plurality of unique instances is, of course, hardly novel. Consider Radin's objections to what he conceived to be the ahistoricism of Boasian anthropology.
We are dealing with specific, not generalized, men and women, and with specific, not generalized, events. But the recognition of specific men and women should bring with it the realization that there are all types of individuals and that it is not, for instance, a Crow Indian who has made such and such a statement, uttered such and such a prayer, but a particular Crow Indian. It is this particularity that is the essence of all history and it is precisely this that ethnology has hitherto balked at doing. [Radin 1933:184-185] More recently, concern with individual persons and events emerged as a focus of "performance" and "experience" orientations in the 1980s (see Turner and Bruner 1986). The value of this perspective as an antidote to an exaggerated preoccupation with scripts, rules, and decontextualized structures is eloquently attested in Abu-Lughod's (1986) writing on the Awlad Ali Bedouins.
It is less clear, however, that an anthropology attentive to "lived experience" can dispense with generalization. At what level of generality does generalization become objectionable? What of the locals' own generalizations, both implicit and articulated, in whose terms they necessarily interpret and act upon their experiences? Are we to focus only on the particulars and neglect the regularities? How then can the two be differentiated? Generalization is unavoidable even when it engages heterogeneity, as with Abu-Lughod's observation that "the two primary discourses [on death]-ritual funerary laments and the Islamic discourse on God's will-were attached to different social groups, men and women" (1990:162). Abu-Lughod again observes that "the pattern of the [Bedouin wedding night] defloration, as I have written elsewhere, is standard" but adds that "every defloration involves a specific set of people and takes place in a particular way" (1990:157) . This example places special emphasis on the fact that a cultural reading cannot predict the outcome of defloration, whether or not there will be blood to index the bride's virginity. "Events," Abu-Lughod informs us, "take different courses. That is the nature of 'life as lived,' everywhere. Generalizations, by producing effects of timelessness and coherence to support the essentialized notion of 'cultures' different from ours and peoples separate from us, make us forget this" (1990:158) . Leaving aside the issue of whether the culture concept makes people forget that events have multiple outcomes, it is questionable whether disciplinary attention to the particular can proceed independently of generalizations about cultural form. Abu-Lughod's examples affirm that the Bedouins are indeed "characterized by certain institutions, rules, or ways of doing things," not least with respect to the protocol of defloration displays which retain a recognizable character from one instance to the next, even as the contextual variables shift to produce diverse outcomes. Clearly, in the passage cited above, Bourdieu accords considerable agency to the linguistic sign "habitus," taken as a phonological or graphic shape conjoined with a meaning that has accrued from earlier scholarly uses a valuable conceptual orientation. Specifically, these earlier uses entail obligatory reference to agents, a denial of objectivism congenial to Bourdieu's project. In contrast, by implication, such imaginable alternatives as conscience collective or culture would be inappropriate because they have accrued from their past uses meanings antithetical to this project. That culture possesses such meanings for Bourdieu is clear from his passing remarks about the concept. First, he understands culture as referring to an abstraction to which deluded anthropologists ascribe agency:
In short, failing to construct practice other than negatively, objectivism is condemned either to ignore the whole question of the principle underlying the production of the regularities which it then contents itself with recording; or to reify abstractions, by the fallacy of treating the objects constructed by science, whether "culture," "structures," or "modes of production," as realities endowed with a social efficacy, capable of acting on agents responsible for historical actions or as a power capable of constraining practices. While we often speak of society as though it were a static structure defined by tradition, it is, in the more intimate sense, nothing of the kind, but a highly intricate network of partial or complete understandings between the members of organizational units of every degree of size and complexity.... It is only apparently a static sum of social institutions; actually it is being reanimated or creatively reaffirmed from day to day by particular acts of a communicative nature which obtain among individuals participating in it. [Sapir 1949:104] An abiding theme of much of Sapir's writing, especially into the 1930s (see Sapir 1994) , is the methodological and theoretical necessity of rejecting the objectivism that Bourdieu construes as essential to the culture construct. Indeed, it could be argued that Sapir's writing negotiates the higher ground between objectivism and methodological individualism more successfully, in certain respects, than does Bourdieu's practice theory. Sapir's culture-historical, sui generis, and subject to the transformative effects of individual improvisation on social consensus-accords considerable agency to its participants (1949:571; see also Goldenweiser 1917; Sapir 1917). In this, it differs from the habitus, which "makes possible the free production of all the thoughts, perceptions, and actions inherent in the particular conditions of its production-and only those" (Bourdieu 1990a:55).
Bourdieu's assertion that the culture construct inevitably construes conduct as the behavioral execution of rule is likewise subject to question. As is well known, Malinowski was overtly critical of legalism, repeatedly addressing his ethnographic virtuosity to its demolition. And if his exposition draws too heavily on a Hobbesian antipathy between the social rule and the refractory egoism of "human nature," it is, nonetheless, the case that his Trobrianders are improvisers, manipulators, and strategists. "Take the real savage," wrote Malinowski, "keen on evading his duties, swaggering and boastful when he has fulfilled them, and compare him with the anthropologist's dummy who slavishly follows custom and automatically obeys every regulation" (1926:30). For Malinowski, legalism exists only rhetorically in the locals' exegesis. Their disposition and conduct are products of an unstable dialectic of strategy, compliance, and improvisation: "[The savage's] sentiments, his propensities, his bias, his self-indulgences as well as tolerance of others' lapses, he reserves for his behavior in real life ... the natural, impulsive code of conduct, the evasions, the compromises and non-legal usages are revealed [through observation] only to the field-worker" (1926:120). Neither was it the case that Malinowski's skepticism toward legalism was limited to the observation that people are ambivalent toward rules and sometimes violate them. For Malinowski, both officialized law and legalized usage emerge from strategic practices; practices in turn transpire amid contradictory laws.
We have to abandon now definitely the idea of an inert, solid "crust" or "cake" of custom rigidly pressing from outside upon the whole surface of tribal life. Law and order arise out of the very processes they govern. But they are not rigid nor due to any inertia or permanent mould. They obtain on the contrary as the result of a constant struggle not merely of human passions against the law, but of legal principles with one another. [1926:122-123] We have here, then, a representation of Trobriand "legal principles" situated in the discourses of interested agents. The point is not that Malinowski (or anyone else to date) explicated a satisfactory theory of the articulation of system with agency but simply that he proposed something rather more complex than Bourdieu's "conduct as execution." If culture is internally contradictory (the matrilineal clan versus the family, official conduct versus individual interest), no objectivist determination of conduct is possible.
Conclusion
Of Eric Wolf's (1980) observation that "the old culture concept is moribund," Ward Goodenough (1989:93) remarked easily that "the same thing could have been said thirty years ago. The term culture has a long history of meaning different things to different people." Unstable in meaning and reference both synchronically and over time, the culture construct has exhibited exceptional lability. Culture's versatility in sense and reference-its capacity to mean something simultaneously to Edward Sapir and Alfred Kroeber or to Ward Goodenough and Clifford Geertz-has variously been cited as grounds for dispensing with it or represented as its great strength. To the question of culture's contemporary relevance, Freilich affirms that the concept is undergoing "progressive simplification and clarification" and that "over time, much superfluous information is weeded out, so that the concept's essence is able to shine through" (1989:2). Regardless of whether one shares his optimism, the question of how the essence is to be specified is clearly relevant to assertions that culture has been, is being, or should be replaced.
By asserting that the old culture concept is dying, Wolf implies that a new culture concept-or some entirely distinct concept-is currently in play. Assertions of this kind pose, of course, complex questions of conceptual periodization and transition. If culture entails legalism, coherence, homogeneity, discreteness, and timelessness, during which (overlapping? discrete?) phases of disciplinary history has this been the case? If the anthropologically derived culture construct has been, is being, or will be displaced, how will we know that the event has occurred? What criteria exist that allow us to assert of a construct like culture that, at some point in time, it has been reconfigured or replaced? How would we distinguish reconfiguration of the existing construct(s) from its replacement by something altogether more novel? If the culture concept is analyzable into a subset of constitutive elements, what are these elements? Which and how many of them must change before a new culture concept supplants the old, or a different concept entirely emerges? How do current reformulations of culture compare in scope and magnitude with changes that the concept has undergone in the past? Much recent criticism seems to concur with Luhrmann's (1993:1058) assertion that culture is presently "more unsettled than it has been for forty years." This is a defensible conclusion but hardly self-evident. One could argue, on the contrary, that culture is not measurably more (or less) unsettled than in the past, but that debate about it is increasingly phrased in Kuhnian idioms of transition rather than in idioms of reconceptualization. Such judgments are, of course, perspectival, and will certainly be easier to assess 50 years from now. As Stocking writes, It is an artifact of historical periodization that the last period always ends in the present moment; but whether that moment, or any other recent moment, marks a significant historical transition is another matter-about which my backwardlooking historicist temperament makes me disinclined to speculate. [1992: Rather than attending both to continuity and transition in the history of anthropological ideas, much of the recent cultural criticism rests upon an essentialist understanding of what culture as an analytical concept means, such essentialism then guaranteeing the argument for conceptual transition. For Bourdieu, Clifford, and Abu-Lughod, every occurrence of the lexeme "culture" seems indifferently to evoke the specters of Benedict's configurationalism, Kroeber's superorganicism, and Malinowski's ahistoricism. But consider what is not evoked by culture: the constructivism of Sapir, the historicism of Radin, the antilegalism of Malinowski. And this is only to cite the ancestors. Does anyone really want to say in the mid-1990s that deployment of the anthropological culture concept necessarily commits us to coherence, homogeneity, ahistoricity, and a legalistic theory of conduct? History, chaos, contestation, and strategy have been anthropological growth stocks since at least 1980, and disciplinary writing reflects this state of affairs, both in theoretical exposition and in the interpretation of ethnographic materials. I suspect that it would be exceptionally difficult to find any theoretically oriented writing in the last ten years that represents fields of social meaning and practice-however labeled-as interactively pristine, configurationally coherent, and lacking history. To take four quite distinct examples, Sahlins (1985), Rappaport (1984), Wagner (1981) , and Rosaldo (1980) do not represent culture or cultures in these terms.
Few would dispute that identifiable shifts in thematic emphasis-configurationalism to disorder, consensus to contestation, synchrony to diachrony, and so forth-have recently occurred in the profession. It is less clear that these shifts index a qualitative transformation of the culture construct or a replace-ment of it. Many of the contemporary concerns-constructivism, historicity, skepticism about boundaries-figure in earlier theoretical projects, variously as subdominant themes or articulated policy positions. They may appear in surprising places, sometimes conjoined uneasily with their opposites, as when Mead (1932) wrote of The Changing Culture of an American Indian Tribe. Implicit in the appeal to practice, discourse, and other substitutes is the assertion that analytic constructs such as culture do not and cannot change as they engage new insights, emphases and topics. The new cultural criticism exhibits a perspective on such constructs-both synchronically and in long and short durees-as discrete, discontinuous, and rigidly periodized rather than continuous, dynamic, and overlapping. The culture construct in these representations is immutable, rather like the primordialist culture criticized by Clifford. It cannot survive modifications of its (imputed) content, and when one or more of its attributes alters, it dies.
The tempered reservations expressed here toward the imminent demise of culture are subject to an important qualification. Increasingly, critical judgments of culture exhibit the illocutionary force (if not the surface form) of such performative speech acts as promising, christening, or sentencing: "I [anthropologist of record] hereby pronounce you [culture] dead or dying in the 1990s" [sound of breaking glass]. The diminishing frequency of the lexical item "culture" in the journals is a tangible sign that the retrospective images of culture synthesized by its critics are eminently performative and imbued with historical efficacy. It is not only that new labels are creating an exaggerated consciousness of paradigmatic transition, that anthropologists who self-consciously reject "culture" in favor of "discourse," "hegemony," or "habitus" will traffic partly in old signifieds with new signifiers. At issue is the question of securing and exercising the authority to define and characterize culture. Neither in earlier disciplinary history nor as deployed in recent anthropological writing does the culture concept consistently exhibit the attributes of ahistoricism, totalization, holism, legalism, and coherence with which its critics selectively reconstitute it. These are invented images of culture, both arbitrary and partial with respect to a much more diverse and versatile field of definition and use. Such images, nonetheless, are rapidly acquiring more authoritative perlocutionary effects. As more and more anthropologists decide that the culture concept does entail these determinate and conceptually defective characteristics, its meaning(s) as a disciplinary construct, presently heterogeneous, will progressively converge with the meanings constructed in the critical literature. When this happens, the phonological shape will exit the active anthropological vocabulary and those features of culture's meaning consistent with current theoretical orientations will be relexified. 7. The obvious disciplinary precedent is the culture area concept whose boundaries were generally acknowledged to be heuristic and arbitrary, different in purpose and scale from what the culture construct conventionally refers to.
Notes
8. Drummond (1980) has also questioned the integrity of discrete cultures, but in the somewhat different terms raised by Bickerton's (1975) critique of the integrity of discrete languages. For Bickerton the concept of a language is problematic both because of the continuousness of elements across the nominal boundaries (as in creoles) and because any set of speech habits "has the potential for merging into any other in a principled way" (1975:180). Given continuousness, there are no languages but only language, the faculte de langage of which particular natural languages are "arbitrary interpretations." Says Drummond, "To be consistent with the creole metaphor, one would have to assert that there are no cultures, only Culture. Any cultural system would contain analytical specifications-or invariant properties in the structural metaphoralready contained in some other, supposedly distinct, cultural system" (1980:372).
9. Avoiding the historical amnesia characteristic of much critical writing on the culture construct, Appadurai (1988:38) also registers earlier anthropological counterpoints to localism, citing specifically Boas, Mauss, Benveniste, Dum6zil, Lord Raglan, and Hocart.
